In his influential book «Coercion, capital and European states» Tilly pointed out that the effeetiveness of the opposition of towns against the process of state formation was closely connected with the sizeofurban centers and theirpolitical and economie power 1 . Large cities with aflowering economy and a considerable impact on the surrounding countryside, fiscally, economically and politically, turned out to be of great importanee for state building princes. In dties where huge amounts of capita! were accumulated, wea!th could easily be tapped by levying allkinds oftaxes and aids, needed forfinancingwars, the installation of centra! institutions and the salaries forthe fast growingnumber ofgovernmental officials. By becoming more dependant on the financial resources of dties, magistrates, who jealously protected the autonomy ofthe town and their own powerful positions, proved to be tough negotiators, especially when they were assembied in representative institutions. Princes with urgent needs found it very difficult to deal with their powerful subjects. Large cities with strongmarket positions frustrated the ambitious plans of centralizing princes and slowed down the state formation process. Only when economie conditions deteriorated, cities could more easily be subrnitted to a central power.
When Philip the Good annexed the Dutch coastal areas, his main interest was not so much focused on the rather small cities as such, butmainly on the promising economie potential of the cluster of towns in Holland and Zealand. Because of a well developed and dense transport network and the fact that the protocapitalistic structure of the surrounding countryside supported the economic and demographic expansion ofthe main urban centers, it was justified to consider the new acquired territories as «terres de promission»2. Inmany ways Leiden can be taken as a typical exponent of developments in the county under Burgundian mIe. Compared to Ghent or Bruges, Leiden was not very large, norvery powerful. At !he advent of !he reign of Philip !he Good !he city eounted about 5.000 or 6.000 inhahitauts. At !he end of !he 15!h centnry !heir number hadincreased to over 14.000 3 .BythenLeiden wasfor somedecades the largest town in Holland. lts demographic expansion was closely connected with the rapid rise of the textile industry. Starting as a rather modest industrial sector halfway the 14th century, it became the spine of the cities weJfare and attracted several thousands ofrural dweIlers and unemployed textile labourers from other eities. Especially!he third quarter of !he 15!h eentnry is regarded as the higbligbt of the Leiden textile industry. The very favourable conditions in Holland at that time were a consequence of Philip the Good's careful policies, characterized by the absence of wars, internal peace and a stabie mint policy4. The situation altered drastieally during!he reign of Charles !he Bold aud Maximilian of Austria. Their war efforts, an almost rigid centralizing policy and unfortunate mint policy damaged the already worsened economie conditions even more. At the end of the century many cities in the Low Countries, among which Leiden, faced baukruptey and could only be saved by the farreaehing intervention of Philip !he Fair and his skilled officials'.
Never!heless, Leiden texti1e industry kept on produeing higb quality c10!h in eonsiderable amount and employed not only labourers living in the city, but also many rural families on the surrounding eountryside. However, Jansma already made clearthatthe city's economie influence was nottumed into large seale political and fiscal domination. Although the area in which the Leiden magistrate was allowed to levy taxes on consumable goods was enlarged several times in the varia, Hilversum, 1990, p. 154.IDEM, Vorming Bourgongdischestaat,in Ibidem, p. 225. With regard to the protocapitalistic structure of the countryside see J.L. VAN 
Rebellion and state intervention
The centralizing poliey of the Burgundians met serious resistance in the large cities ofthe Southern Netherlands.Between 1436 and 1490 11 major urbanrisings are to be counted of which three in Bruges (1436-1438, 1485 and 1488-1490) and four in Ghent (1447-1453,1467,1485,1487-1492). Other risings occured in Liege, Dinant and Malines. In the Northem Low Countries Utrecht and several eities in the county of Holland, among whlch Leiden, rebelled between 1480 and 1483. In all cases the towns were submitted by force, sometimes even destroyed, and deprived of privileges which guaranteed their political autonomy7.As Tilly pointed out, war became a state monopoly not onlyin order to defend the new territorial borders but also to repress internal unrest. The monopoly of violence was reached by denying the use of affilS and other means of coercion by all subjects. Princes gradually succeeded in disarming their subjects byissuinglaws forbiddingthe carryingofweapons. They also tried to preventthe escalation offeuds between families by submittingtheir quarreIs to urban or even state courts 8 • Although the position of the Burgundian princes was never seriously challenged in Leiden, many of the above mentioned aspects of the state fOffilation proeess are to befound there.In 1434, theveryfirstyearofthe reign of Philip the Good as count of Holland, a new issued ordination forbidding the carrying of affilours and long knives in public fOffiled the direct cause of an attack against the sheriff, the countsrepresentative, and several ofhis helpers bymembers ofaleading family called Van Berendrecht. The Van Berendrechters and a group of supporters had provoked the sheriffby refusing to take off their annours and by paradingarmed through the mainstreet ofthe city.Afight broke out and the sheriff had to be protected by some members of the city council. Orre of his deputees was wounded in the face with a knive 9 • The bidden cause behind this fight was connected with the partystrife in Holland, known as the «Hoekse en Kabeljauwse twisten». Struggles between both factions had already atfected politicallife in Leiden since 1350. In 1420 members of the Hoeks party took over Leiden by force" in orderto turn the city into a bastion againstJ ohn of Bavaria, thenew count of Holland who had taken sides with the Kabeljauws. After laying siege to the city the Hoeks were repelled from political power. FIOm that moment on a Kabeljauws majority controlled urban politicslO . Nevertheless tensions between both factions remained and must probably be connected with the murder of John of Bavaria in 1425. On january sixth the duke died ofwhat is believed the consequences of poisining. The main suspect, Jan van Vliet, confessed he obtained the poison from some English merchants who maintained contacts with banished members of the Hoeks faction. By lubricating the poison on the pages of the prayer book ofthe duke, who apparently had the nasty habit oflicking his fingers before tumingthe pages, he eventually killed him.Besides Jan van Vliet who was put to death, the Leidener Hoeks Pieter Butewech and his brother Dirk de Bruin were thought to be accomplices. Because of that members of the knighthood and representatives of the main cities of Holland requested expulsion ofbothLeydeners from the Zoen or Treaty of Delft signed in 1428, which regulated relations and govemmental competencies between Philip the Good and Jaqueline of Bavariall.
Some time later Dirk de Bruin was killed bymembers ofthe Kabeljauws faction who were out for revenge. To prevent further escalation, the duke forbade other attempts ofrevenge by members and friends ofthe victim'sfamily. However, duringthe fightinLeiden, the Van Berendrechtfamily made allusions to themurder of their uncle Dirk de Bruin and broke by doing that the law 12. The reason for the attack on the sheriffbecomes more c1earer now. Being the duke's representative, the sheriff embodied the centra! govermnent which had forbidden the carrying of weapons and by doing that hindered the ancient right of revenge and feud. In that way the Van Berendrecht family, who were members of the anti-Burgundian Hoeks faction, was forced to accept regulations of a government they did not support and that maintained the actual balance of power withln the city. Indeed, peace and order were restored af ter the duke ordered his stadholder, Huge of Lannoy, lord ofSanles, lopunish theriolers.Although lhe acls ofthe Van Berendrechters in tact demanded death penalty and seizure oftheir possessions, the duke showed bis benevolence and suggested moderate punishment in order to maintain peace in the county. Convictions did not reach further than banishments and forced pilgrimages 13 . This approach characterizes the policy of the Burgundian duke in the early years of bis reign. Also during risings of tullers in Ghenl belween 1423 and 1427 the duke was equally reluclanl, hoping thaI this attitude would prevent further unrest among the textile workers who were out to alterthe balanceofpowerin that city14.Asin Ghent, thedukesupported the present government by thanking his sheriff and the members of the city council for maintaining the ducallaws.
Ten years later Philip the Good took a somewhat finner point of view against rebelling members of the Hoeks faction in Leiden. The struggle was a eonsequence of the unfortunale policy of sladholder William of Lalaing, who openly supported the Hoeks by appointing them in all kinds of luerative functions not only in Leiden, but also in Amsterdam and HarIem. Agitation between Hoeks and Kabeljauws had also roused beeause of the irregular financial poliey of Hoeks treasurers in several towns, the dissatisfaction with the height of the indemnifieation payments eoncerningthe peaee treaty with Copenhagen in 1441 and the levying of aids. In 1444 riols broke oul in Har1em which demanded tbe altention ofthe duke's wife Isabella of Portugal. Whileleaving the city she had 10 'Suffer a humiliating seareh ofher bagage, in whieh Harlem Kabeljauws suspected the stadholder to be hidden. After appointing several Hoeks magistrates in Amsterdam, William of Lalaing provoked enonnous tension between both factions there, resuIting in heavy fighls in the course of 1444 and 1445 15 . In Leiden riots broke out in 1445, when it became clear that the Hoeks schout Floris van Boschhnijsen had approprialed money oul of a bastards legacy of which half belonged 10 the duke. He was replaced by the Kabeljauw Simon Vrederick Willemszn. who assumed office the day beforePenteeoste. The deputee and brother in law of the former sheriff, having greal difficulty with accepting the shift of power, provoked Simon Vrederiek WillemsZll. The same night by almost running into him deliberately. The provocation was seen as a crime against the centralgovernment for which he was eventually banished for life.
The confrontation caused serious fights within the city on june 17th. which ended with the withdrawal ofthe Hoeks assailants. Because of the clash between both factions, members of the council in Holland travelled on high speed to Leiden to investigate the causes ofthe riots. They also ordered the installation of two captains who had to restore and maintain law and order. Their presence, Initially the duke took severe measurements. An anny lead by Aernt van Egmond was garrisoned in Leiden for several months. The council of Holland convicted three main instigators to death. Many others were banished varying from one yeOIto alifetime. Fines vatied from 4 lb. Hollands to 400 pounds. Sentences concerning forced pilgrimages were hardly pronounced. Nevertheless, witbin two yeOIs tbe duke started to grant amnesty to many exiles and already in 1449 a general pardon was announced. The nextyearmostconvictedHoeks were to be found in the City16. Again the duke, whose position was in factnever questioned, showed some benevolence in order to prevent that deep rooted frustration became a threat to peace in the county.
In january 1481 Leiden was occupied by an army of Hoeks, mainly made out of victims of a succesfui Kabeljauws coup in 1479 who were driven into exile since tben. They were supported by soldiers from Guelders and Utrecht headed by tbe condotierri ReiniervanBroekhuizen and Willem van ZuijlenNyevelt. The attack resulted into the replacement of the present Kabeljauws magistrate, whlch was openly supported by Maximilian. Nonetheless, the Hoeks created a new regime and occupied the eity form0re than three months. Although the Hoeks on several occasions requested legitimation of the new political order, their attempts met severe resistance. The Hadsburg emperor would never allow a Hoeks regime to remain tbat gained power witb help of troops from Utrecht and Guelders, wInch already formed a threat to hls territories. Furthermore the Kalbejauws tried to convince Maximilian of the risk that Leiden would be turned into a Hoeks bastion fiom which coups in other eities could be planned.Itwould mean large scale rebellion and a real threat to Maximilians position. Already the situation in Gouda, Schoonhoven and Dordrecht, eities who traditionally chose sides with the Hoeks, proved to be quite worrysome. Fast and firm action seemed to be needed. Maximilian gave orderto his stadholder JoostvanLalaingto assembie an annythatwould put siege to the city. Despite some Hoeks successes when troops c1ashed in theneighbourhoodofAlphen, tbeHoeks proved not to be able to witbstand tbe siege and surrendered on april 15tb. Probably with regard to the very tense situation in several other eities in Ho1-land, Maximilian did not spare the rebellions. Already duringthe siege two captured Hoeks were put to death by Joost van Lalaing. When Maximilian entered the city on april 19th seven others suffered the same fate. The majority of the emprisoned Hoeks were senteneed to lifetime exile and se1zure of theirpossessions.Furthermore the city was senteneed to a 50.000 poundsfine, to be payed for 2/3 by the city and 1/3 by the inhabitants, with exception ofthe captured Kabeljauws during the Hoeks occupation. The emperor «reserved}) 20 prisoners to deal with them as he liked. Theywere eventually released af ter paying a considerable ransom 17 . TheHoeks occupationin 1481 turned Qutto be thelast outburstof large scale factionstrife in Leiden. Contrasts between Hoeks and Kabeljauws slowly faded away together with the resistance against the centralizing policy of the Burgundians and Habsburgers.
Based on

Interferenee in city polities
An important aspect of the centralizing strategies of the Burgundian dukes was the alteration of urban political structures af ter rebelling eities had been submitted to central power. Privileges that guaranteed urban autonomy were very of ten withdrawn. In fact the centra! government grabbed the opportunity to dismantle political networks making out obstacles to the state building process or changed these in such waythatloeal rulers became more co-operative.According to Bloclanans and Prevenier the Burgundian dukes eonsciously tried to turn rather autonomous urban governors into agents of their centralizing policy18. However, they never meant to elinrinate the existingpolitical struetures because these were needed to maintain law and order and also moulded local social and economie policies. Elias held the opinion that princes took sides with the underdog, generally rivals of those who were in power, in order to prevent complete superiority of autonomous ruling elites. Ifthe latterwere the case the position of the central govemment would have been undennined or even become superfluous because people always would turn to those who effectivelywere in power 19 • Althoughmany objections have been formulated againstElias' sometimes superfieial approach beeause of lack of weIl based comparisons and his insufficient knowledge of specific circumstanees, both points of view ean be used as a touchstone for the Leiden situation 20 . Very specific for the Dutch situation was the existence of sa called «vroeds-chappen»; councils designed at the end of the fourteenth century to advise the daily goveming circle made out of sheriff, burghomasters and aldermen. The majority of functions of the «gerecht» or daily administration were assigned to members of the Vroedschap, relatives of factionmembers. Jansen stated that the vroedschappen started to c10se ranks by co-optation from 1425 on, the year that Philip the Good assumed his rulingtasks inHolland 21 . In fact thatkind of election procedure already eXÎsted about 1400 and does not seem to be the only explanation for the enclosure of the ranks of vroedschap members against newcomers halfway the 1420 22 • It seems more accurate to say that Hoeks could be prevented to enterthe vroedschap af ter John ofBavarialayed siege to Leiden in 1420 and forced all Hoeks out ofleading positions within the town. He was able to do sa by granting the nomination right of daily administrators to the victorious Kabeljauws. As did his predecessors, the duke rented this rigbt to some rich burghers, mostly supporters ofhis policy, for a considerable amount of money. These farmers were able to build up au enormous authority within the city and assigned most functions again to re1atives and faction members. In that way a mechanism was created that enabled the Kabeljauws to force rivalling Hoeks into apolitical minority, althoughit turned outin 1434 thatsomeHoeks had managed to become co-farmers ofthe nornination right of aldermen 23 • InLeiden, the election ofburghomasters was the exclusive right of the vroedschap, dominated by Kabeljauws since 1420, while the sheriff rented his office directly from the duke himseli By using this procedure, the dukes created a network that in general supported the Bavarian and Burgundian politica! option.
Nonetheless, in 1434 the new countofHolland, Philip the Good, abolished the farrning procedure in Leiden 24 . It is tempting to interpret this measure as one of his many attempts to enforce a politica! equilibrium of Hoeks and Kabeljauws in order to prevent further outbursts of partystrife. One should however take into account that this privilege was issued at request of the townmagistrate, which was dominated by Kabeljauws. By abolishing the farming system, the duke lost undoubtedly some very powerful pawns, buth at the same time supported the Kabeljauw faction, for the Leiden magistrate retumed to the procedure of cooptation which was much to the advantage ofthe majority ofrulers, beingKabeljauws. One ofthe veryfew Hoeks who was capable to obtain a seat in the magistratein the course ofthe 1430's was Willem vanBerendrecht, the onlymemberof his family who during the not of 1434 made serious efforts to calm down high 21 running emotions 25 . The stadholder was permitted to grant him pardon for his remarkable role in the quarrel. Apparently hls performance was rewarded with political recognition. However, as mentioned before, in 1445 he belonged to the leaders of the Hoeks resurrection and was convicted for bis complicity26.
The political unrestin 1444-1445 had put an end to the career ofWillem van Lalaing and the political domination of the Hoeks in Leiden. Many Hoeks were driven into exile which gave the Kabeljauws the opportunity to regain theiI formerpositions within themagistrate 27. Dissatisfaction with the existing balanee of power forced members ofthe Hoeks faction in 1449 to launch a new attempt to overthrow the Leiden magistrate. That yeaT representatives from Leiden were confronted with the rumaur that some Hoeks had offered a large amount of money to the duke, in exchange for his permission to «reorganize» the daily administration. The magistrate was only able to prevent this coup by asking the dukeforthe installation of an election council of fourty members, to which Philip agreed only after he was offered the sum of 1824lb 8 sh 28 • In !bis case !he duke profited from tensions between both parties. The election council of Fourty or « Veertigraad» had no otherobligations then electing 16 candidate aldennen out ofwlrich the duke would nominate out the needed 8 officials. Theoretically the duke should have been able to reach some kind of equilibrium between Hoeks and Kabeljauws. A considerabIe majority of council members was however Kabeljauws and once again the Hoeks were poody represented in all political institutions for the years to come 29. The privilege of the council ofFourty had to be renewed in 1452 and 1462, but only after the magistrate had agreed on paying considerable aids 30 • While Philip the Good respected existing privileges and remained in general loyal to Iris political option in supporting the Kabeljauws magistrate, Iris son Charles the Bold turned out to be less reluctant. On several occasions he blackmailed the Leiden magistrate by pointing out that rich Hoeks factionmembers were prepared to allow hlm extensive loans in exchange for politica! power. Furthermore he refused to renew the privilege of Fourty in 1472. His motives were clear. By strenghtening hls grip on the appointment of aldermen he undermined theKabeljauws domination. particularly clear in 1475 whenhe tried to surpass!he vroedschap's rightto elect the burghomasters and wanted to force hls own Hoeks norninees upon the city31. His attempt failed but relations between the duke and the tawn magistrate of course worsened.
During the confused period after the duke's sudden deathin 1477 representatives ofthe knighthood and large cities from the Burgundian territoIies within the Low Countries succeeded in forcing his daughter and successor Maria to undo the excesses afhef father's centralizing policy. Orre of the issues dealt with in the separate Privilege for Holland and Zealand, concerned the restoration of the election councils in most dries, among which Leiden 32 . There, even contradictions between Hoeks and Kabeljauws were put aside in order to proteet and restore !he politica! autonomyofthe city. Onjaouary 31rst 1477 101 nobles aud eminent burghers from Leiden swore to put an end to all discord and promised to govern the city in good order and co-operation. As a consequence both factions had to be equally represented in all governing bodies, probably inc1uding the new council ofFourty33. The harsh policy of Charles !he Bold, who in bis attempts to gain control over the Leiden ruling circle had chosen sides with its opponents, had in the end opposite effect.
The reconciliation of Hoeks and Kabeljauws was however not to lastvery long. Quarreis between both factions already came up in 1479 and resulted in a coup of Kabeljauws on !he third of july. Alileading Hoeks were exiled, leaving !heir families bebind and suffering seizure of their possessions. Maximilian legalized the Kabeljauws assumption of power by granting them pardon for their actions. He nevertheless ordered the new magistrates to return the seized possessions to their rightful owners. This turned out to be a very longlasting procedure and lawsuits were broughtforward initially at !he Court of Holland aud later on before!he Grote Raad or Great Council at Malines 34 . In the meantime many Hoeks remained in exile and had no access to their possessions. Frustrations ran high and ended up in the treaty with the already mentioned condotierre van Broekhuizen and the attack on Leiden injanuary 1481.
Af ter the siege and restoration ofthe Kabeljauws political power, Maximilian, who initially withdrew the privilege ofthe Council ofFourty, allowed its restoration a couple of months later. This time the list of members was made up by the sovereign himself. Vacancies were to be filled by co-optation. It put an end to all political ambitions of the Hoeks who were for years to come exc1uded from the town magistrate. Only atthe close of the decade someHoeks were allowed to participate in the daily administration, but they were only few 35 . The very difficult financial situation in Leiden, partIy caused by the economie depression and unfortunate mint poliey of Maximilian, posed about 1500 a severe threat to the urban autonomy. In 1496 Philip the Fair took farreachlng measurements to reorganize the city finances. He ordered extension ofpayment of all debts, the levying of new taxes and a property tax of 1 % among all inhabitants. Officials from the central govemment were put in charge of the operation, but initially all competencies of the magistrales remained unchallenged. In 1504 it became clear that the goals of the reorganization were not met. According to Blok, themagistrate was blamed forthis failure. The duke cancelled the privilege of Fourty and nomination rights of the vroedschap. Instead he nominated twa burghomasters and two treasurers for a period of four years 36 . AlSD the remarkable continuity of names of the elected aldennen shows that the duke relied on experienee and stability in order to solve the immense problems the city found itselfin.
Af ter the death of Philip the Fair in 1506, Maximilian, now tutor ofthe future Charles V,pursued the same policy. Onlyin 1510, whenmostproblems seemed to be solved, the removed privileges were to a large extent restored. However Maxirnilianmade some importantprovisions that allowedhim to hold a stronggrip on the structure of the town magistrate. He demanded that all me.mbers of the new council of fourty should also obtain a seat in the vroedschap. Since the vroedschap at that time hardly counted fourty members, the effect was that both councils almost completely overlapped 37 . In that way Maximilian constructed apolitical network, that almost entirely consisted of magistrates of bis own choice.
Conclusion
As could be expected in the case of a rather smallscale town, with little infLuence on the surrounding countryside, Leiden was no real bastion against the centralizing policy of the Burgundians. In fact tensions between Hoeks and Kabeljauws offered the dukes several opportunities to interfere in city politics and mould it to their own needs. Despite several urban risings during the reign of Philip the Good, his position was never challenged. The Hoeks coup of 1481 posed a threattothe souvereign but bymakinguse ofmilitaryforcehe quite easily subdued the city and restored the balanee ofpower. Through time the approach of the dukes altered. While Philip the Good remained to a large extenl loyal to the Kabeljauws option, bis son Charles took sides with the rivals of those in power and seemed to follow the pattern Elias propagated. Maximilian retumed to the Kabeljauws option, especially when it tumed out that the Hoeks faction posed a rea! threat to bis position. Nonetheless, all dukes tried to establish afirm basis of 36 supporters oftheir polieywithin the city by controlling to a large extent the nomÎ-nation of aldennen and the structure of the eouneil of Fourty. The worsened economie and financial situation in the city caused a farreaehing intervention of Philip the Fair in city polities. Although his measures were softened by Maximilianlater on, he nevertheless profited :Erom the poliey ofhis predecessor and maintained a firm grip on the town magistrate which almost consisted completely of loyal supporters.
